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Abstract 
This paper examines the bank productivity growth and integration process for the 28 EU 
countries during three main phases of the financial crisis: the U.S. subprime crisis (2007-2008), 
the global financial crisis (2009-2010) and the sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012). We extend the 
Malmquist Productivity Index by applying an additive two-stage DEA model. This allows us to 
explore the sources of growth in different stages of production. Furthermore, we assess the 
integration of European banks by analyzing the β-convergence and σ-convergence of the two-
stage Productivity Index. Our results show a productivity growth during the U.S. subprime crisis, 
but a consistent decline during the global financial crisis. The loss of competitiveness of the 
European banking system is due to the drop of the performance stage and technical change. 
Finally, we find a strong convergence pattern during the financial crisis, mainly driven by the 
catch up process of some Eastern countries and the drop in performance of Western countries.  
Keywords: Banking, European Union, Data Envelopment Analysis, Two-Stage, Productivity 
growth, Convergence. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis have severely 
undermined bank stability and destabilized the process of bank integration in Europe. From the 
onset of the financial crisis, national public authorities have adopted wide-ranging interventions, 
such as recapitalization, providing debt guarantees, and conducting asset purchases, to reduce the 
fragility of the banking system and restore confidence in the financial markets. Even though 
these interventions could have been beneficial for the stability of the banking system, they have 
also raised concerns as regards their impact on bank competition and consequently banking 
integration (e.g. Berger & Bouwman, 2013; Calderon & Schaeck, 2015). The global financial 
crisis (GFC) appears in fact to have contributed to a leveraging of the existing differences and 
fragmentation between countries in Europe, and slowed down the banking integration process 
(Matousek et al., 2015). More generally, the GFC has shown the fragility of the monetary union 
and the lack of a sufficient degree of financial and fiscal integration to react promptly to negative 
macroeconomic shocks (Lane, 2012). During the years 2007-2012, the European banking system 
went through three main financial crisis’ phases that have exerted a heterogeneous and 
asymmetric impact across countries and especially the Euro area (Histrov et al., 2012). For 
example, countries with a great reliance on external funds, and especially on short-term debt 
markets, such as Ireland, were strongly affected by the global financial crisis (Milesi-Ferretti and 
Tille, 2011). 
According to Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2012) and recently by Fiordelisi and Ricci (2015), the 
financial crisis period can be divided in the following three phases: the subprime financial crisis 
(2007-2008), the global financial crisis (2008-2010) and the sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012). 
At the beginning of the subprime financial crisis in 2007, the central banks’ interventions seemed 
to work effectively (Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2015). Despite the large losses in the subprime 
mortgage market, the overall impression was that the worst was going to end soon (see Mishkin, 
2011). However, in late 2008, as a consequence of the collapse of large US financial institutions 
such as Lehman Brothers and AIG and the run on the Reserve Primary Fund, the financial crisis 
worsened (Mishkin, 2011). In this phase, the financial crisis started to affect Europe as much as 
the United States and it became “global”. Through 2008 and 2009, the focus was on the 
interventions put forward by the European Central Bank in response to the global financial shock 
rather than on the country-specific financial risks (Lane, 2012). At that time there were no 
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indications of a profound European sovereign debt crisis that since the second half of 2009 
plunged economies in some EU countries into a deep recession, e.g. Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain (GIIPS). These countries experienced a raise in deficit/GDP ratio and 
increasing estimates of prospective banking sector losses on bad loans (Mody and Sandri 2012). 
The most shocking news was however originated in Greece with the revelation of the extreme 
violation of the euro’s fiscal rules (Broner et al., 2014; Lane, 2012). All these events contribute 
to a sharp deterioration of the situation and a raising of the spreads on sovereign bonds between 
Germany and GIIPS countries. Nonetheless, not only the GIIPS countries suffered as a result of 
the sovereign debt crisis, but the entire Eurozone was affected by this phase of the crisis. The 
government bond markets in the Eurozone became more fragile and more susceptible to self-
fulfilling liquidity crises, as they were associated with negative sentiments that were strong at the 
end of 2010 (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013). Even the European countries1 with the best competitive 
and growth prospects experienced an increase in spreads in a significant manner when their 
financial sectors were under stress (Modi and Sandri, 2011). However, such an effect was higher 
for countries facing a large debt burden.  
All these adverse developments and events have impacted on the banks’ productivity and 
harmed the process of integration as some countries were more vulnerable than others. The 
financial crisis exerted a pervasive pressure on banking system and undermined the banking 
activities from both the funding side and the lending side. From the funding side, banks were 
under pressure because of the freezing of the European Interbank market, and the threat of the 
drop of the deposit supply side because of “bank runs” (Iyer et al., 2014). From the lending 
supply, banks appear to have consistently reduced their lending activities and new loans (e.g. De 
Haas and Van Horen, 2013; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2013). In addition, over the period 2008-
2012, the EU-27 banking and financial received state aids in terms of total recapitalization and 
asset relief for EUR 1337.26 bn, and EUR 3931.71bn in terms of total guarantees and liquidity 
measures2.  
In this context, some important empirical questions arise: How did the productivity of 
European banks change during the three phases of the crisis: The U.S. subprime crisis (2007-
                                                          
1 The sample encompasses Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain. 
2 Source: European Commission. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/financial_economic_crisis_aid_en.html, May 2016. 
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2008), the global financial crisis (2009-2010) and the sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012)? What 
were the sources of productivity change in Europe during the crisis? How and to what extent did 
the financial crisis affect the convergence process of the European banking system? How did the 
GIIPS countries and the countries in the Euro zone behave compared to the banks in other EU 
countries? 
This paper address these issues and provides empirical evidence on these unexplored 
avenues of research. It specifically contributes to the existing literature on productivity and 
convergence in three ways. Firstly, we examine the patters of productivity growth. While 
previous papers mainly focus on the link between efficiency and integration (Weill, 2009; Casu 
and Girardone, 2010; Matousek et al., 2015), they divert their attention away from the sources of 
productivity growth. The productivity index encompasses different sources of growth that can 
play a pivotal role for the economic recovery of Europe after the financial crisis. Not only bank 
efficiency, but innovation is a relevant driver for economic growth as well (Aghion and Howitt, 
1998; Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Therefore, our aim is to assess the sources of productivity 
growth and the underlying processes of European banking integration during the financial crisis. 
Secondly, a further contribution of our study lies in providing new evidence on the 
drivers underlying the bank productivity and converge patterns between “Old Europe” and “New 
Europe” during the crisis period. The recent financial crisis could have slowed down the 
integration process of the “New Europe” with the “Old Europe”. Transaction economies have 
recently suffered from a sharp drop in the rate of investments. Moreover, there was a consistent 
deleveraging process in the banking system, which has contributed to a widening of the credit 
crunch of industrial firms (EBRD, 2015).  In addition, the turmoil in the Euro zone exerted a 
negative effect on the growth of transition regions, especially for those countries whose banking 
sector is deeply integrated with Eurozone-based banks3.  
Thirdly, this paper introduces an innovative methodological approach to examine the 
productivity and convergence of the EU banking system. To our best knowledge, this is the first 
paper that examines the productivity and convergence of the EU banking system by applying a 
two-stage data envelopment analysis (DEA) model. We apply a relational two-stage DEA model 
in order to assess the components of the productivity index. This model allows us to overcome 
                                                          
3Retrieved from http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/REP/regional-economic-prospects1210.pdf, February 
2016.  
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the classical deposit dilemma that affects the identification strategy of empirical studies on bank 
efficiency. It in fact treats deposits as an intermediate variable (Fukuyama and Matousek, 2011; 
Fukuyama and Weber, 2010; Holod and Lewis, 2011). In other words, we use deposits as output 
in a first stage where employees and capital are inputs, and as input to produce financial assets 
(loans and other earning assets) in a second stage. In particular, we employ the Malmquist 
productivity index to evaluate the productivity of 539 commercial banks in the EU-28 countries 
during three periods of the financial crisis. We first disaggregate the productivity into efficiency 
change, technical change, and scale change using Ray and Desli’s (1997) decomposition. 
Furthermore, drawing on Kumar and Russell (2002) we investigate the convergence of the 
overall bank productivity and the productivity of the above two stages. By disentangling the 
production process of a bank, we can better identify different sources of transmission of 
inefficiency or decline of innovation in the European banking system. This new approach enable 
us to examine both the sources of productivity for both banks’ lending and funding activities. 
This is important to fully address our research questions. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the recent literature about 
productivity and convergence in the first part and two-stage DEA models and deposits dilemma 
in the second part. Section 3 describes the methodology; Section 4 presents and discusses the 
empirical results Last, Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review 
This section reviews the recent literature on the convergence of European banks and 
serves as a theoretical background for the examination of total factor productivity in banking 
industry and the two-stage DEA models and their application to banks. 
 
2.1. European banks’ convergence 
Starting from the empirical work of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Sala-i-Martin 
(1996), there has been an increasing number of studies that have examined the link between cost 
efficiency and convergence in the European banking sector (Brissimis et al., 2010; Casu and 
Girardone, 2010; Goddard et al., 2010; Matousek et al., 2015; Weill, 2009). The process of 
financial integration across EU countries has attracted considerable attention from researchers 
and policy makers in the last two decades. Since the introduction of the First Banking Co-
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ordination Directive in 1977, and as a result of the deregulation process, the European Union has 
advanced several key policy initiatives in order to foster a Single European Market in banking 
and financial services. The scope of a well-integrated financial system was to increase the 
efficiency of European banks by improving the allocation of financial resources and promoting a 
more competitive and efficient financial system (Casu and Girardone, 2010). These regulatory 
changes have subsequently been the object of several studies to assess their effectiveness and 
impact on the banking system. The results of previous papers provide evidence of an increasing 
integration process, but also highlight discrepancies among countries mainly due to local 
customs, norms, and national characteristics (recently Casu and Girardone, 2010; Gropp and 
Kashyap, 2009; Rughoo and Sarantis, 2012). The general view is that more in-depth financial 
integration can improve the EU’s financial system. However, it can also bring negative 
externalities with it. Casu and Girardone (2010) argue that the integration in a particular market 
segment can for example lead to a high degree of consolidation that can in turn harm the 
competition and catch-up process of some countries. 
Even though the European Union has tried to stimulate the integration of financial 
systems to reduce regional dissimilarities by proposing several legislative and non-legislative 
measures (European Commission, 2014), formal and informal norms, and infrastructure still 
present considerable dissimilarities between European countries (Barros et al., 2007). In light of 
this, Goddard et al. (2010) maintain that barriers to the integration process consist of the 
consumers’ preference towards local or national banks rather than to foreign banks, local banks’ 
access to private information about borrowers’ creditworthiness, and different prices charged by 
banks for each component of the bundle of financial services offered in different markets. The 
empirical results on European banking integration are rather inconclusive as they display mixed 
findings. Among them, a few papers make use of the β-convergence and the σ-convergence tests 
to examine the integration patterns of European banking system. For example, Weill (2009) 
investigates the banking efficiency convergence in Europe for the period 1994-2005. He finds 
evidence of convergence in cost efficiency for the European banking industry. In the same vein, 
Casu and Girardone (2010) find support for efficiency convergence and integration for European 
banks.  
Following the financial crisis of 2007 and the subsequent Euro zone crisis of 2010, the 
theme of banking integration in Europe has been the object of renewed interest from policy 
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makers and scholars. For example, Matousek et al. (2015) investigate the efficiency convergence 
during the financial crisis for EU-15 countries. While they show the presence of club formation 
with weak convergence, they however do not find any evidence of convergence following the 
financial crisis. Recently, Casu et al. (2016) examined the extent to which productivity converges 
within and across banking industries as a result of technological spillovers over the period 1992 
to 2009 for EU-12 countries. They find evidence of technological spillovers that have led to 
progression toward the best technology, but also the existence of persistent differences in 
productivity. 
Our study aims to provide additional evidence for the above literature by analyzing the 
link between productivity growth and convergence during different phases of the crisis (the U.S. 
subprime crisis (2007-2008), the global financial crisis (2009-2010) and the sovereign debt crisis 
(2010-2012)) for EU-28 countries. This will be of great interest to policy makers who need to 
assess the stability and competitiveness of the European banking system and identify prompt, 
corrective interventions. We elaborate on the methodological contribution in the next sections of 
this paper. 
 
2.2. An overview of the studies on total factor productivity (TFP)  
The concept of total factor productivity (TFP) refers to the ratio of all of outputs 
produced over all of the inputs employed to produce them. In the context of this paper, we 
employ the Malmquist index that has been proposed by Malmquist (1953) and further developed 
by Caves et al. (1982) and Färe et al. (1994a) drawing on the distance function approach. This 
index allows us to decompose and identify the productivity growth‘s sources, efficiency change, 
and technical change. A best-practice bank is defined as the one with a score over 1 in 
Malmquist productivity index, efficiency change and technical change simultaneously (Barros et 
al., 2009). Despite the extensive empirical literature, it is still debated whether the primary 
source for productivity growth is either the efficiency change (Berg et al., 1992; Isik and Hassan, 
2003), or the technical change (Alam, 2001; Assaf et al., 2011; Barros et al., 2010; Casu et al., 
2004; Chang et al., 2012; Koutsomanoli et al., 2009; Mukherjee et al., 2001). Other methods also 
consider a factor for scale changes (Altunbas et al., 2001; Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 1997; Ray 
and Desli, 1997; Sturm and Williams, 2004) as discussed in the methodological section. 
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A vast amount of literature has investigated bank productivity and its components. A 
number of these studies have also addressed this issue for the European banking system. One of 
the first studies to assess the productivity change in European banking industry was Berg et al. 
(1992) who focused on the impact of deregulation on Norwegian banks for the period 1980-
1989. Similarly, other studies have examined the impact of financial deregulation and regulatory 
changes on productivity of banks in a single country context (e.g. Battese et al., 2000; 
Kumbhakar et al., 2001) or in an international institutional setting (e.g. Casu et al., 2004; 
Brissimis et al., 2010, Casu et al., 2016). Generally, these empirical findings advocate a 
declining technical efficiency but also suggest a technical progress and productivity growth for 
European Banks because of the liberalization process.  Existing studies have used various 
econometric models and techniques (parametric and non-parametric) to assess banks efficiency 
and productivity growth (see among others, Casu et al., 2004; Goddard et al., 2007; Fethi and 
Pasiouras; 2010; Barros and Williams, 2013; Barros and Wanke, 2014; Wanke et al., 2015; 
Tzeremes, 2015; Wanke et al., 2016). In the context of this paper, previous investigations 
focusing on the non-parametric approach have mainly made used of the traditional DEA model 
to examine the productivity of banks. As a novel contribution to this literature, this paper 
combines the TFP with the two-stage DEA model.  The advantages of this latter method are 
explained in Section 2.3 and in the methodological part. 
 
2.3. Two-stage data envelopment analysis and banking 
Unlike the traditional DEA as formulated by Charnes et al. (1978), the two-stage DEA 
model separates the internal processes through which inputs are transformed in outputs. In 
particular, the two stage- DEA model requires the definition of intermediate variables to link 
different stages of production. These intermediates are treated as outputs in the first stage and 
inputs in the second stage. The general concept of two-stage DEA models is based on the 
pioneering work of Färe and Grosskopf (1996) who were the first to study the “black box”. 
Wang et al. (1997) and Seiford and Zhu (1999) were the first to construct a pure two-stage DEA 
model where all the outputs of the first stage are the only inputs of the second stage. Halkos et al. 
(2014) classified two-stage network DEA models into four categories relative to the relationship 
among the overall efficiency and the efficiency of each stage: independent (Wang et al., 1997; 
Seiford and Zhu, 1999), connected (Chen and Zhu, 2004), relational (Kao and Hwang, 2008; 
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Chen et al., 2009) and game theoretic (Liang et al., 2006,2008). In this study we use the additive 
relational model of Chen et al. (2009).  
Over the last decade, this method has become very popular in the banking literature (e.g. 
Akther et al., 2013; Fukuyama and Weber, 2010; Fukuyama and Matousek, 2011; Holod and 
Lewis, 2011; Mukherjee et al., 2003; Wang et al., 2014; Wanke and Barros, 2014; 
Degl'Innocenti et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2016) because of the solution it offers to the so-called 
deposits dilemma. While the traditional approaches (namely the asset or intermediation 
approach, value-added or production approach and the cost approach) discussed by Berger and 
Humphrey (1992) treat deposits either as input or as an output, a two-stage DEA model handles 
deposits as an intermediate variable. In other words, at the first stage, deposits enter the 
production function as outputs, while in the second stage they are modelled as inputs to be 
invested in earning assets. Therefore, the dual role of deposits is kept intact.  
Kao and Hwang (2014) extended the multiplicative two-stage DEA model to a multi-
period Malmquist Productivity Index. In this study, we construct a Malmquist Productivity Index 
using the additive relational model of Chen et al. (2009). By combining the Malmquist 
Productivity Index with a two-stage DEA model, we are able to better explore the sources of 
growth in different stages of production. The two-stage DEA allows us to take into account the 
dual role of deposits and to identify where inefficiencies and impediments to innovation are 
located in the first and/or in the second stage of the production process. This also enables us to 
examine how and to what extent the financial crisis exerted pressure on the banking system and 
undermined the banking activities from both the funding side and the lending side. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. The additive two-stage DEA model 
In this section, we outline our methodological approach. The proposed model is based on 
the additive efficiency decomposition approach proposed by Chen et al. (2009)4. Given n DMUs, 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚), 𝑧𝑑𝑗 (𝑑 = 1, … , 𝐷) and 𝑦𝑟𝑗 (𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠) are respectively the ith input, the dth 
intermediate variable, and the rth output respectively of the jth DMU (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛). Moreover, 
𝑣𝑖, 𝑤𝑑 and 𝑦𝑟 are the multipliers of the model. The overall efficiency 𝐸0 is in the following form: 
                                                          
4 See Halkos et al. (2014) for a literature review. 
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𝐸0 = 𝜉1
∑ 𝑤𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝐷
𝑑=1
∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖0
𝑚
𝑖=1
+ 𝜉2
∑ 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟0
𝑠
𝑟=1
∑ 𝑤𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝐷
𝑑=1
 
(
1)  
The relative contribution of each stage to the whole process is represented by 𝜉1 and 𝜉2 where 
0 ≤ 𝜉1, 𝜉2 ≤ 1 and 𝜉1 + 𝜉2 = 1. These are not chosen in an arbitrary way; instead they are 
proxied by the size of each stage. Chen et al. (2009) define the overall size of the DMU as the 
sum of the first stage and the second stage inputs.  
The VRS version of the additive two-stage DEA model of Chen et al. (2009) is as follows5: 
 
 
𝐸0 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝐷
𝑑=1
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑟𝑦𝑟0
𝑠
𝑟=1
+ 𝑢1 + 𝑢2 
  
(2)  
s.t. 
∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑥𝑖0 + ∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝐷
𝑑=1
= 1
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
  
 
∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑𝑗
𝐷
𝑑=1
− ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢
1 ≤ 0
𝑚
𝑖=1
, 
 
 
∑ 𝛾𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑗
𝑠
𝑟=1
− ∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑𝑗
𝐷
𝑑=1
+ 𝑢2 ≤ 0, 
 
 𝛾𝑟 , 𝜇𝑑, 𝜔𝑖 ≥ 0  
 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛;  𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚; 𝑑 = 1, … , 𝐷; 𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠  
 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 are free in sign  
There may be more than one optimal solution in (2) because the optimal multipliers 𝛾𝑟
∗, 
𝜔𝑖
∗ and 𝜇𝑑
∗  may not be unique either. Chen et al. (2009) give pre-emptive priority to one of the 
stages while maintaining the overall efficiency as calculated before. Here, we choose to give 
priority to the second stage as depicted in the next section.  
 
 
𝐸0
2 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑ 𝛾𝑟𝑦𝑟0
𝑠
𝑟=1
+ 𝑢2 
  
(3)  
s.t. 
∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑0 = 1
𝐷
𝑑=1
 
  
                                                          
5 The constant returns to scale version of the model is obtained by omitting 𝑢1 and 𝑢2. 
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∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝐷
𝑑=1
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑟𝑦𝑟0
𝑠
𝑟=1
− 𝐸0 ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑥𝑖0
𝑚
𝑖=1
+ 𝑢1 + 𝑢2 = 𝐸0, 
 
 
∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑𝑗
𝐷
𝑑=1
− ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢
1 ≤ 0
𝑚
𝑖=1
, 
 
 
∑ 𝛾𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑗
𝑠
𝑟=1
− ∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑𝑗
𝐷
𝑑=1
+ 𝑢2 ≤ 0 
 
 𝛾𝑟 , 𝜇𝑑, 𝜔𝑖 ≥ 0  
 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛;  𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚; 𝑑 = 1, … , 𝐷; 𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠  
 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 are free in sign  
Finally, the first stage efficiency based on (2) and (3) is calculated as6: 
 
𝐸0
1 =
𝐸0 − 𝜉2
∗𝐸0
2
𝜉1
∗  
(4)  
3.2. Malmquist Productivity Index  
Benchmark technology is to be distinguished from a best practice technology in terms of 
returns to scale (Lovell, 2003). While the former satisfies constant returns to scale, the later 
satisfies variable returns to scale. The departure of the best practice technology from benchmark 
technology can be accounted as scale effects. According to Färe et al. (1994a), the Malmquist 
Productivity Index (MPI) is defined on a benchmark technology. Suppose that we want to find 
the change in productivity between two periods, t and t+1. Using a specific period as benchmark 
technology, MPI is calculated as the ratio of the distance functions of period t+1 to period t. 
Since it is arbitrary to address either of these periods as the benchmark technology, it is a 
common practice to define MPI as the geometric mean of these two ratios. Subscript “c” stands 
for constant returns to scale and “D” for distance function. For example, 𝐷𝑐
𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1) is the 
distance function of inputs-outputs (x,y) in period t+1 using period t as a benchmark technology. 
 
𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑐(𝑥
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡, 𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1) = [
𝐷𝑐
𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1)
𝐷𝑐
𝑡(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡)
∙
𝐷𝑐
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1)
𝐷𝑐
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡)
]
1/2
 (5) 
                                                          
6 There exists an extreme case for the additive two-stage DEA model where either 𝜉1
∗ or 𝜉2
∗ is zero, and therefore the 
individual stages’ efficiencies are undefined. Chen et al. (2009) address this problem by restricting 𝜉1
∗ and 𝜉2
∗ in 
order to be positive. Halkos et al. (2015) proposed an alternative weight assurance region model to deal with the 
problem of the additive two-stage DEA model. This model is able to solve the aforementioned problem of 𝜉1
∗ or 𝜉2
∗ 
and incorporates any available prior information regarding the contribution of each stage to the whole process.  
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Färe et al. (1994a) decomposed the MPI index into an efficiency change and a 
productivity change in terms of benchmark technology. Färe et al. (1994b) redefined the 
efficiency change term into efficiency change relative to best practice technology and scale 
change. There is a wide debate across the literature regarding this decomposition. The major 
objection is that the technical change term continues to be estimated relative to benchmark 
technology, therefore it captures the change in the maximum average product. Ray and Desli 
(1997) questioned the internal consistency of this decomposition, and Lovell (2003) criticized it 
for inadequacy and vague economic interpretation. Ray and Desli (1997) proposed an alternative 
decomposition that estimates the technical change term relative to a best practice technology and 
measures the sources of productivity in economically meaningful way. However, the 
disadvantage of this approach is that it yields a number of infeasible scores due to variable 
returns to scale in mixed periods (Grosskopf, 2003). The subscript “v” stands for variable returns 
to scale. 
 
𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑐(𝑥
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡, 𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1) =
𝐷𝑣
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1)
𝐷𝑣
𝑡(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡)
∙ [
𝐷𝑣
𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1)
𝐷𝑣
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1)
∙
𝐷𝑣
𝑡(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡)
𝐷𝑣
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡)
]
1/2
∙ 
 ∙ {[
𝐷𝑐
𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1)/𝐷𝑣
𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1)
𝐷𝑐
𝑡(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡)/𝐷𝑣
𝑡(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡)
∙
𝐷𝑐
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1)/𝐷𝑣
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1)
𝐷𝑐
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡)/𝐷𝑣
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡)
]}
1/2
 
(6) 
The first term outside the brackets is the efficiency change, the second term outside the brackets 
is the technical change and the term inside the brackets is the scale change. Apart from the 
consistency and meaningful economic interpretation, Ray and Desli’s (1997) decomposition is 
better suited for the additive two-stage model of Chen et al. (2009). Ang and Chen (2016) found 
that the weights of Chen et al. (2009) are non-increasing which means that the weights of the 
first stage are larger than the weights of the second stage. However, this is only true for the CRS 
version of the model. The VRS version of the model allows the weights of the second stage to be 
larger. Evidently, the present paper contains such cases. Therefore, Ray and Desli’s (1997) 
decomposition which is based on variable returns to scale is better suited for our model. 
Appendix A modifies the additive model (2-4) in order to calculate all the components 
for the MPI index (6) for the overall model, the first stage and the second stage.  
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3.3. Tests of convergence 
This section presents the tests that we use to investigate the convergence of productivity. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) constructed two tests for convergence, β-convergence and σ-
convergence. The β-convergence regresses7 the growth rate on the initial level of any variable, 
for example productivity. If the coefficient is statistically significant and reveals a negative 
relationship among growth rate and initial level, then there is a convergence while if the 
relationship is positive there is a divergence. The interpretation of this type of convergence is 
that countries with lower levels of productivity experience faster growth than countries with 
higher initial levels of productivity. Equation (7) shows the regression for β-convergence of the 
MPI index. 
C ln 𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑗,𝑡 − ln 𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑗,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ln 𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 (7) 
where 𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑗,𝑡 is the Malmquist Productivity Index for DMU j in time t, 𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑗,𝑡−1 is the 
Malmquist Productivity Index for DMU j in time t-1, α and β are the parameters which will be 
estimated and 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 is the error term.  
The σ-convergence for the estimation of cross-sectional dispersion indicates how quickly 
the productivity change of each DMU is converging to the average productivity change.  
 𝛥(ln 𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑗,𝑡 − ln 𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) = 𝛼 + 𝛽(ln 𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑗,𝑡−1 − ln 𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑡−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡    (8) 
where the left term is the first difference of ln 𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑗 from its mean. Again, there is convergence if 
the coefficient is statistically significant and reveals a negative relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables.  
 
4. Empirical application 
4.1. Data and model description 
We collected unconsolidated annual income statements and balance sheet data from the 
Fitch-IBCA BankScope (BSC) database. For our analysis, we only include commercial banks 
from 28 EU countries. We dropped banks with negative equity values and missing values for 
total assets. Hence, our sample consists of 539 commercial banks for 28 EU countries. All data is 
deflated to 2010 prices. Following Fukuyama and Weber (2010), we construct a two-stage 
banking efficiency model in order to keep the dual role of deposits. The overall index includes a 
                                                          
7 A GLS regression (Kumar and Russell, 2002). 
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value added activity index in the first stage and a profitability index in the second stage. We 
follow a similar input-output framework with Fukuyama and Matousek (2011) and Holod and 
Lewis (2011) (Figure 1). In the first stage we use total assets and the number of employees as 
inputs, while deposits function as the output. Deposits then enter the second stage as inputs, 
whereas loans and securities are the final outputs. Bank assets are traditionally composed of 
loans and securities. All data comes from the Bankscope database. Table 1 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the inputs and outputs. All the variables are in values of thousand. The 
high standard deviation for all the variables suggests the presence of big differences across banks 
and countries. In countries such as Italy, France, Spain and Portugal, banks are more specialized 
in lending activities and tend to have more loans compared to banks of similar size in other 
countries (Casu et al., 2016). Therefore, it is more plausible to find a higher standard deviation 
for output variables such as loans and securities.  
We use the additive two-stage DEA model of Chen et al. (2009) for the evaluation of the 
efficiency scores. We choose to give pre-emptive priority to stage two because the focus during 
the crisis is on deposits and loans.  
 
Figure 1 around here 
Table 1 around here 
 
Next, we employ the DEA-based Malmquist Productivity Index measures for the 
calculation of the productivity change over time, as presented in Appendix A. Banks with 
productivity change over 1 experience productivity growth, while banks with productivity 
change under 1 experience a decline in productivity. Ray and Desli (1997) decomposition is 
applied as presented in (7). As depicted earlier, following Fiordelisi et al. (2014) and Fiordelisi 
and Ricci (2015) we consider three periods of the financial crisis to examine the productivity 
change: the U.S. subprime crisis (2007-2008), the global financial crisis (2008-2010) and the 
sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012). Finally, we split our sample for GIIPS countries and Euro 
countries as a robustness test. 
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4.2. Results 
In this section, we first discuss the productivity change scores and their decomposition. 
Then we examine the convergence trend among European countries.  In Table 2, we describe the 
overall trend of productivity growth for the entire sample. We specifically report the results for 
the overall process, the value-added stage and the performance stage. In general, we notice that 
during the first period of the US subprime crisis (2007-2008), the overall two-stage system of 
European banks experience productivity growth (1.07 on average), which can be mainly 
attributed to the efficiency growth (1.19) rather than to technical change (0.92) and scale change 
(0.98). This result can be explained by the fact that the crisis started to exert an impact on Europe 
in 2009. This could shed light on why we still observe an overall improvement of productivity 
during the 2007-2008 period until the onset of the global financial crisis.  
 
Table 2 around here 
 
The second period of the global financial crisis (2008-2010) appears to have been harsher 
for the European banks in terms of productivity with respect to the previous one. The overall 
productivity growth is (0.81), which is mainly driven by a major decline in technical change 
(0.45). European banks also appear to have experienced a decline in the productivity growth. 
This drop especially refers to the banks’ performance in the first stage (0.74) and is mainly due 
to the decrease of technical change (0.29). In contrast, we find evidence of a productivity growth 
in the second stage (1.80). Finally, the third period during the sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012) 
is characterized by a relative stability for the overall model (0.99) and the first stage (1.02) in 
terms of both productivity and its subcomponents. At the same time, there is a significant decline 
in the productivity of the second stage (0.83) mainly driven by a drop of technical change (0.73).  
Table 3 shows the components of the productivity growth for each country. 
 
Table 3 around here 
 
 We report the results for the overall process, the value-added stage and the performance 
stage. At first glance, we can tell that each country responds to the crisis in a different way. In 
the first period during the US subprime crisis, banks in small peripheral economies such as 
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Greece and new EU countries such as Lithuania and Romania experienced a productivity growth 
while banks in more advanced economies such as the UK and France experienced either a slow 
or null productivity growth. A potential explanation is that global European banks were involved 
more in securities backed by subprime mortgage loans and other US “toxic” assets that were 
conduits for international shock transmission (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011). Global European 
banks are highly leveraged financial institutions in larger economies such as the UK, France, and 
Germany (Noeth and Sengupta, 2012). Therefore, banks in these countries were the first to be 
affected by the economic crisis. 
The second period during the global economic crisis yields quite different results. The 
whole European Union is unproductive, however banks in larger economies such as France and 
Germany experienced moderate effects relative to banks in peripheral countries (Greece, Spain 
and Portugal) and new EU countries (Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Poland). Since 
October 2008, large banks recur to huge recapitalization efforts and also benefit from the 
injections of further public funds. Despite massive state aid, the overall productivity of the 
European banks was very low during this phase of the crisis. Furthermore, starting from May 
2010 Europe’s Finance ministers established the European Financial Stability Facility to ensure 
financial stability across the Euro zone (Molyenux, 2013). This especially aided European banks 
holding a large share of sovereign debt, which is typical in Germany and France. This could 
provide an explanation for our results. On the contrary, our finding shows that Greece fell from 
the first place during the first period to the last place during the second period. As shown in 
Table 3, the problem of Greece lies at the first stage, which is the value added activity where 
banks utilize their inputs to produce deposits. During the first period, Greece experienced a 
productivity change of 1.269 at the value added activity stage, while during the second period 
this was a highly unproductive stage (0.494). By January 2009, ten Central and Eastern European 
countries had already asked for a bailout. At the end of 2009, Greece’s credit rating received a 
downgrade from Fitch (initially from A- to BBB+) followed by downgrades from S&P and 
Moody’s. In addition, banking crises in Ireland in 2008 and in Spain in 2012, exacerbated the 
liquidity and solvency troubles of the banking sector, which caused a large fiscal burden (Correa 
and Sapriza, 2014). This then pushed the financial crisis into a sovereign debt crisis for these 
countries. As argued by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), banking crises typically precede or coincide 
with sovereign debt crises. The results in the sovereign debt crisis period reveal a stability in 
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productivity change across the majority of the countries. This may be due financial support 
mechanisms such as the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), along with supportive policies from European Central Bank, which also 
contributed to enhance the banking stability.  
Interestingly, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Greece show an overall improvement of 
productivity in this phase of the crisis, mainly driven by their value added activities. At the same 
time, they exhibit a strong drop in the performance stage during the sovereign debt crisis as one 
should expect since the strong economic recession they went through8. These countries received 
large amount state aids in different form: recapitalization (Ireland: 51.8 mln Euros; Greece: 33.5 
mln Euros), guarantees (Ireland: 393 mln Euros, Greece: 145 mln Euros; Portugal: 30.1 mln 
Euros; Italy 97 mln Euros), and other liquidity measures (Greece: 16.3 mln Euros; Portugal: 6.5 
mln Euros)9. In the case of Greece, the financial crisis led to strict fiscal consolidation 
(Arghyrou, 2015). As a part of the fiscal consolidation, staff reductions and wage cuts took 
place. Evidently, in our dataset, six out of seven Greek banks reduced both their inputs, with 
employee reductions up to 23% from 2010 to 2012. The drop of inputs explains why the 
productivity of the value added stage is constant during this period of the crisis despite the 
decrease of deposits in Greece.  
However, we find a strong drop in the profitability stage for several countries. This is 
plausible since banks tend to change the composition of their securities portfolio during 
sovereign stress (Acharya and Steffen, 2013; Correa and Sapriza, 2014). Some European banks 
have for example purchased sovereign debt from distressed countries because of high returns. 
Banks in some countries (especially the UK) also reported a huge amount of credit losses and 
write downs (Molyneux, 2013). This has also affected their productivity in the second stage (for 
UK is 0.973). In addition, we find that some Eastern countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, 
Lithuania, and Croatia display a positive or constant (as in the case of Hungary) productivity 
growth during the sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012). Many transaction economies went through 
some enforcement actions to decrease abuse of market power and to promote a competitive 
                                                          
8 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016. 
9 Data retrieved from European Commission 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/financial_economic_crisis_aid_en.html, February 2016. 
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environment (such as Romania)10. The Eurozone sovereign debt crisis slowed down the growth 
of transaction countries, which were particularly exposed to Eurozone stress, but only starting 
from the first half of 2012. At that time, there was a strong cross-border bank deleveraging going 
on, related to the deepening Eurozone crisis, especially in Central Europe and the Baltics (CEB) 
and South-Eastern Europe (SEE)11. 
 Table 4 presents the results of the productivity convergence among European banks. The 
first line shows the convergence results for the first (2007-2008) and the second (2008-2010) 
period and the second line shows the convergence for the second and the third (2010-2012) 
period. The second and the third column present the β-convergence and σ-convergence scores for 
the overall model. Finally, the fourth and fifth columns report the corresponding results for the 
first stage, while the last two columns do so for the second stage. 
 
Table 4 around here 
 
 Both β-convergence and σ-convergence coefficients for the overall model, the first stage 
and the second stage are negative and statistically significant for 0.001. We recall here that a 
negative coefficient indicates a convergence trend among the banks in our sample. Therefore, 
our results provide strong support for the convergence hypothesis among European banks during 
the financial crisis. Our findings are in line with a few recent studies that examine the integration 
patterns among European banks (Weill, 2009; Casu and Girardone, 2010). Instead, it does not 
coincide with Matousek et al. (2015)’s paper, which explores the convergence trend during the 
recent financial crisis as we do as well. Differently from the above mentioned papers, we 
examine the convergence of productivity growth rather than solely focusing on efficiency scores. 
We recall here that productivity growth encompasses three different components, namely 
efficiency change, technical change and scale change. This makes our results unique.  
Figures 2a and 2c present scatterplots of productivity growth on the initial level of 
productivity change with a fitted GLS regression line. Figures 2b and 2d show the densities of 
productivity change. In addition, Figures 2a and 2b examine the convergence of the first and the 
                                                          
10 Data retrieved from Transition indicators by country provided by EBRD, http://www.ebrd.com/what-we-
do/economic-research-and-data/data/forecasts-macro-data-transition-indicators.html, January 2016. 
11 Data retrieved from http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/REP/regional-economic-prospects1210.pdf, 
December 2015. 
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second period, whereas Figures 2c and 2d show the convergence of the second and the third 
period. For all these Figures, there is evidence of a strong pattern of convergence. There is in fact 
a strong negative correlation between the productivity growth and the log of the initial level of 
productivity change.  
 
Table 3 around here 
Figure 2 around here 
 
Next, we verify whether the inclusion of specific countries in our sample has affected our 
results as concerns the convergence of productivity among European Banks (Appendix B). The 
Euro countries have increased the fiscal risk during the peak of the crisis and made the duration 
of recovery process longer than for other countries (Lane, 2012). This could have had an impact 
on the convergence process of Euro countries. In addition, in the Euro area, the GIIPS countries 
experienced a harsh sovereign debt crisis in late 2009. Therefore, we re-run the analysis by 
splitting the Euro countries from the countries that have their own currency, and the GIIPS 
countries from the other ones. Our results and conclusions are robust to all specified sub-
samples. 
 
4.3. Discussion and policy implications 
There are two possible explanations for our findings regarding the strong convergence 
pattern among the banks in the EU28. First, an important warning comes from the decomposition 
of the productivity growth in the two stages. As is evident from Table 2, the decline of 
performance in the second stage is the main driver for the drop of the overall productivity. This 
is due to the decline of technical change for the period 2010-2012. As discussed by recent 
papers, banks reduced their lending activities. New loans fell dramatically during the financial 
crisis (De Haas and Van Horen, 2012). This could explain why we find a very low performance 
in the second stage of the production function, where loans are the outputs. However, they also 
show that the raise of drawdown by borrowers on the existing credit line mainly drove the 
increase of commercial and industrial loans for US banks. In this respect, our findings add new 
evidence to this stream of research. We in fact find that countries that exhibit higher productivity 
in the first stage tend to perform worse in the second stage. This result can be explained referring 
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to the theoretical and empirical work of Kashyap et al. (2002) and Gatev and Strahan (2006). 
These papers maintain that banks that extend more credit lines are more prone to collect fund 
through deposits. Even though we cannot observe this phenomenon directly, we find these 
arguments a plausible explanation for our results.  
Furthermore, the threat of the drop of deposit supply because of the “bank run” could 
have harmed the lending activities of banks. Moreover, the freeze of the European interbank 
market has contributed to a credit supply reduction especially for Small and Medium Enterprises 
(Iyer et al., 2014). Furthermore, several banks in Europe have become extremely conservative as 
they have raised capital and their liquidity position but at the same time reduced their lending 
activities. This is also because they suffer from huge credit losses. These phenomena could have 
led to the drop of banks’ productivity, especially in the performance stage as indicated by our 
results. In particular, in 2012 the European area went through a recession period with countries 
experience a low or even a negative GDP growth (such as Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Cyprus)12. Second, our findings suggest that convergence among European banks is 
mainly driven by the loss of competitiveness of the Western banking system and catch-up 
process of some Eastern banks especially during the sovereign debt crisis period. However, as 
depicted earlier, transaction countries started to be expose to the Euro zone sovereign debt crisis 
only starting from the first half of 2012.  
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the limits of the Euro area to put forward 
cohesive and effective adjustment mechanisms in response to the financial crisis. What emerges 
from this analysis is that, even though the response to the crisis was heterogeneous among 
countries, the European banking system overall has shown itself to be vulnerable in a period of 
macroeconomic and financial shocks. Part of the fragility of Europe can be attributed to the 
fragmentation of the regulatory system and weakness of the supervision system. In the case of 
the Euro area, the retaining of national responsibility for financial regulation and fiscal policy 
and the lack of a unified framework has also played an important role in the weak response to 
financial and macroeconomic shocks (Lane, 2012). Moreover, national approaches to the crisis 
management resulted to not be effective in restoring banking stability and investor confidence, 
and they had adverse spillover effects over the European countries. In addition, despite the 
                                                          
12 Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2015. 
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European government launching several loan and fiscal schemes, and bank rescue plans to 
preserve the banking system, there was however little agreement and cooperation as regards the 
sharing the fiscal costs generated by the crisis (Molyenux, 2013).  This could explain why the 
European banks experience a sharper drop of their productivity especially in the second period of 
the global financial crisis (2008-2010) and consequently a low productivity growth in the 
following period.  
These findings suggest the need for new policy initiatives by the EU, which aim to 
provide a more unified regulatory system that nowadays is still rather fragmented and nationally 
oriented. EU countries should move towards joint decision-making regarding their national 
budgets and economic policies. In other words, steps should be made towards the Financial 
Union and a unified banking supervision system to promptly react to crisis periods and limit the 
consequences of negative spillover effects across the European countries. The European 
Commission is moving towards this direction. According to the so-called Five Presidents’ Report 
(European Commission, 2015), there is a need to put forward economic policies to ensure the 
smooth and correct functioning of the “Economic and Monetary Union”. This process requires 
together with an Economic, Fiscal and Political Union, also a Financial Union which also 
encompasses the promotion of a Banking Union. In particular, for the Banking Union three 
pillars have been established: the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) to harmonize 
supervisory actions and corrective measures and ensure the consistent application of regulations 
and supervisory policies; the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for prompt effective and 
unified actions to restore confidence in the marks and prevent banking runs and contagions; the 
European Deposits Insurance Scheme (EDIS). The latter pillar has yet to be implemented. This is 
of crucial importance since most of the money in the EU (and worldwide) is in deposit form. 
Restoring confidence in the safety of bank deposits irrespective of the place/country the bank 
operates would be a major step for the resilience against future crisis and can further boost 
banking productivity. However, such initiatives should improve the ability of banks to absorb 
shocks caused by financial and economic stress and to promote resilience in banking systems 
without burdening their productivity or lending activities. 
Lastly, our findings show that European banks experienced a very low scale efficiency 
especially during the global financial crisis (2008-2010). This would suggest that the size of 
operations was not optimal during the peak of the financial crisis. An important question for 
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policy makers arising from this finding is whether there is the need to impose limits on the size 
of banks. This would eventually also minimize potential moral hazard problems and the risk-
taking attitude associated with the size of banks because of the high probability of being bailed 
out, which could also potentially harm the medium-long term productivity.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate the sources of bank productivity growth and the underlying 
patters of the integration process for the 28 EU countries during the financial crisis. By 
combining the Malmquist Productivity Index and an additive two-stage DEA model we explore 
the sources of growth in different stages of production and we quantify the contribution of 
individual components (inputs and outputs) to productivity change. We then investigate the 
convergence of the overall bank productivity and the productivity of the above two stages by 
applying the regression framework proposed by Kumar and Russell (2002).  
This paper provides important new findings and policy implications. Our results show a 
productivity growth (+7%), mainly driven by efficiency changes (+ 19%), especially for 
peripheral countries and new EU countries during the U.S. subprime crisis (2007-2008).  
However, we find evidence of an overall consistent drop of the productivity growth during the 
global financial crisis (2008-2010). In particular, during this phase the productivity growth 
displays a decreasing trend (- 19%). The low level of productivity was also persistent during the 
sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012). This latter phenomenon was a generic trend especially for the 
performance stage (-17%). The drop of technical change and of the productivity in the second 
stage are the main factors responsible for the performance’ decrease of European banks during 
the financial crisis. The deterioration of lending activities and new loans could have strongly 
contributed to the loss of competitiveness of the European system. The tests for β-convergence 
and σ-convergence show evidence for productivity growth convergence for every period and 
every model (overall, first and second stage). Our results and are robust to different sub-samples.  
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 Figure 1: Two-stage bank process 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
  2007 2008 2010 2012 
Number of 
employees 
Mean 4996 5307 5335 5258 
Std. dev 17398 19140 19406 19197 
Fixed assets (*) 
Mean 72388032 76162809 71621239 71775550 
Std. dev 282385300 310595325 277369541 277379219 
Deposits (*) 
Mean 39665765 38185549 40753124 40949427 
Std. dev 139955377 127491258 145799024 141945967 
Loans (*) 
Mean 32116759 32479529 33474178 31769372 
Std. dev 113954364 110648904 117079977 109018777 
Securities (*) 
Mean 27839922 31505927 23941448 24237030 
Std. dev 150406207 184886958 118506217 122390558 
 
Note: The Table presents descriptive statistics (mean values and standard deviation) for all banks in our sample. (*) 
Values are in thousands of Euros.  
 
 
 
Table 2: Overall Malmquist Productivity Index  
 
  2007-2008 2008-2010 2010-2012 
  MPI eff tech scale MPI eff tech scale MPI eff tech scale 
Overall Process 1.072 1.197 0.923 0.981 0.804 2.231 0.453 0.970 0.986 1.016 0.974 1.001 
Value Added 1.105 1.275 0.937 0.955 0.740 3.643 0.289 0.981 1.022 1.030 1.007 0.997 
Profitability 0.936 1.080 0.851 1.030 1.795 0.678 3.963 0.963 0.825 1.177 0.738 1.021 
 
Note: The Table reports the main summary results from all the countries in the sample during the U.S. subprime 
crisis (2007-2008), the global financial crisis (2009-2010) and the sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012). MPI is the 
Malmquist productivity index; eff is technical efficiency; tech is technical change; scale is scale efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value added 
activity 
Profitability 
 
Employees 
Total Assets 
Deposits 
Loans 
Securities 
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Table 3: Malmquist Productivity Index per Country 
Overall bank process 
Bank Country 2007-2008 2008-2010 2010-2012 
  MPI eff tech scale MPI eff tech scale MPI eff tech scale 
Austria 34 1.041 1.119 0.942 1.003 0.785 1.680 0.527 0.958 0.954 1.009 0.975 0.976 
Belgium 16 1.040 1.079 0.960 1.005 0.894 1.542 0.663 0.966 0.979 1.033 0.957 0.991 
Bulgaria 3 1.137 1.273 0.882 1.012 0.653 3.322 0.214 0.981 1.033 1.033 0.991 1.008 
Croatia 18 1.018 1.180 0.886 0.990 0.701 3.253 0.220 1.004 1.022 1.026 0.996 1.001 
Cyprus 3 1.106 1.214 0.912 0.999 0.877 2.098 0.428 0.925 0.941 0.935 0.981 1.026 
Czech Rep. 11 1.030 1.127 0.932 0.984 0.783 1.679 0.497 0.964 0.972 1.019 0.965 0.990 
Denmark 27 1.011 1.098 0.925 0.998 0.815 1.802 0.505 0.975 1.038 1.074 0.965 1.000 
Estonia 3 1.040 1.146 0.909 1.000 0.648 2.441 0.313 0.943 0.958 0.966 0.995 0.998 
Finland 5 1.126 1.226 0.930 0.990 0.813 1.739 0.539 0.954 0.952 1.018 0.938 0.998 
France 75 1.024 1.113 0.933 0.991 0.861 1.962 0.499 0.981 1.010 1.115 0.981 0.991 
Germany 75 1.061 1.122 0.950 1.002 0.856 1.673 0.599 0.968 0.953 0.995 0.959 0.997 
Greece 7 1.237 1.335 0.905 1.025 0.607 1.730 0.377 0.949 1.019 1.016 0.991 1.013 
Hungary 9 1.105 1.539 0.906 0.826 0.738 2.493 0.330 0.922 0.976 0.987 0.971 1.021 
Ireland 7 1.096 1.143 0.951 1.009 0.909 1.248 0.743 0.957 1.020 0.985 0.990 1.049 
Italy 47 1.063 1.174 0.919 0.990 0.846 2.003 0.451 0.971 1.011 1.046 0.975 0.993 
Latvia 11 1.159 1.294 0.894 1.001 0.918 3.344 0.267 1.026 0.929 0.950 0.981 0.995 
Lithuania 6 1.165 1.298 0.892 1.006 0.874 3.691 0.296 0.997 0.996 1.003 0.993 0.999 
Luxembourg 35 1.058 1.060 0.987 1.008 0.843 1.267 0.710 0.984 1.043 1.066 0.978 1.001 
Malta 4 1.006 1.083 0.935 0.999 0.944 2.237 0.524 0.980 0.917 1.003 0.908 1.011 
Netherlands 14 1.022 1.165 0.960 0.957 0.872 1.626 0.658 0.977 1.025 1.045 0.977 1.006 
Poland 13 1.134 1.403 0.894 0.903 0.706 3.340 0.290 0.923 0.953 0.977 0.974 1.002 
Portugal 11 1.064 1.141 0.930 1.002 0.721 1.502 0.509 0.960 1.005 1.046 0.954 1.007 
Romania 6 1.164 1.404 0.894 0.916 0.701 4.183 0.221 0.951 0.988 1.005 0.990 0.994 
Slovakia 6 1.054 1.348 0.892 0.889 0.826 3.171 0.265 0.985 0.984 1.006 0.971 1.008 
Slovenia 12 1.075 1.178 0.900 1.014 0.896 2.639 0.360 0.976 0.998 1.015 0.982 1.002 
Spain 16 1.033 1.120 0.945 0.974 0.786 1.583 0.566 0.988 0.977 1.040 0.975 0.979 
Sweden 10 0.970 1.072 0.924 0.979 0.843 1.708 0.513 1.001 0.985 1.011 0.982 0.993 
UK 55 0.984 1.057 0.951 0.996 0.799 1.517 0.587 0.982 0.956 1.020 0.966 0.976 
Value added activity 
Austria 34 1.092 1.184 0.953 0.994 0.719 2.391 0.348 0.968 0.969 0.997 1.005 0.973 
Belgium 16 1.117 1.151 0.981 0.989 0.783 2.110 0.474 0.981 1.027 1.012 1.013 1.001 
Bulgaria 3 1.147 1.281 0.899 0.997 0.609 5.849 0.116 1.003 1.065 1.067 1.005 0.995 
Croatia 18 1.037 1.188 0.899 0.997 0.647 5.598 0.119 0.988 1.059 1.057 1.005 0.997 
Cyprus 3 1.116 1.252 0.919 0.973 0.838 3.172 0.250 0.961 1.000 1.002 1.005 0.994 
Czech Rep. 11 1.078 1.201 0.940 0.959 0.708 2.428 0.313 0.976 0.997 0.995 1.005 0.997 
Denmark 27 1.040 1.123 0.943 0.987 0.697 2.648 0.314 0.999 1.102 1.098 1.005 0.999 
Estonia 3 1.024 1.130 0.915 0.992 0.578 4.138 0.170 0.938 0.928 0.924 1.005 1.000 
Finland 5 1.203 1.444 0.950 0.918 0.686 2.269 0.369 0.979 1.063 1.062 1.005 0.996 
France 75 1.051 1.166 0.947 0.973 0.799 3.173 0.322 0.990 1.069 1.278 1.025 1.024 
Germany 75 1.133 1.194 0.961 0.993 0.753 2.378 0.396 0.981 0.984 0.984 1.005 0.998 
Greece 7 1.269 1.426 0.916 0.978 0.494 2.554 0.213 0.952 1.053 1.057 1.005 0.991 
Hungary 9 1.042 1.746 0.916 0.713 0.737 4.603 0.182 0.922 1.027 1.027 1.005 0.996 
Ireland 7 1.184 1.380 0.974 0.903 0.816 1.484 0.536 0.962 1.134 1.112 1.027 0.998 
Italy 47 1.071 1.188 0.934 0.973 0.801 3.186 0.278 0.969 1.064 1.064 1.005 0.996 
Latvia 11 1.180 1.293 0.906 1.004 0.991 6.444 0.145 1.028 0.906 0.900 1.005 0.999 
Lithuania 6 1.211 1.327 0.905 1.007 0.835 6.744 0.156 1.006 1.002 0.997 1.004 1.001 
Luxembourg 35 1.127 1.121 1.006 0.993 0.764 1.587 0.534 0.999 1.123 1.114 1.008 1.000 
Malta 4 1.041 1.117 0.958 0.983 0.899 3.665 0.362 0.987 0.996 0.993 1.008 0.995 
Netherlands 14 1.049 1.230 0.984 0.924 0.809 2.658 0.449 0.992 1.094 1.092 1.005 0.998 
Poland 13 1.165 1.414 0.908 0.965 0.653 6.190 0.163 0.911 0.958 0.957 1.005 0.997 
Portugal 11 1.120 1.195 0.947 0.984 0.622 1.970 0.337 0.981 1.031 1.026 1.005 1.001 
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Romania 6 1.178 1.546 0.898 0.872 0.634 7.525 0.116 0.942 0.984 0.981 1.005 0.998 
Slovakia 6 1.109 1.834 0.903 0.796 0.843 5.556 0.142 1.078 1.015 1.011 1.005 0.999 
Slovenia 12 1.113 1.232 0.915 0.990 0.873 4.703 0.203 0.971 1.042 1.038 1.005 1.000 
Spain 16 1.053 1.169 0.965 0.933 0.686 2.197 0.380 1.011 0.986 1.016 1.012 0.992 
Sweden 10 0.986 1.092 0.939 0.963 0.742 2.613 0.311 1.007 0.971 0.968 1.005 0.999 
UK 55 1.007 1.085 0.966 0.982 0.716 2.161 0.407 0.979 0.980 1.004 1.009 0.973 
Profitability 
Austria 34 0.831 0.941 0.851 1.041 2.549 0.923 3.590 0.967 0.738 1.322 0.684 0.975 
Belgium 16 0.828 0.934 0.845 1.055 1.928 0.742 3.112 0.967 0.638 1.096 0.608 0.990 
Bulgaria 3 1.031 1.133 0.858 1.054 1.137 0.270 5.146 0.921 0.895 1.163 0.829 0.989 
Croatia 18 0.978 1.156 0.844 1.005 1.332 0.303 4.485 1.004 0.985 1.122 0.891 1.011 
Cyprus 3 0.996 1.120 0.842 1.061 1.733 0.768 3.587 0.770 0.378 0.391 0.772 1.287 
Czech Rep. 11 0.810 0.935 0.850 1.024 1.720 0.595 3.396 0.946 0.740 1.287 0.612 0.953 
Denmark 27 0.895 1.039 0.838 1.032 1.969 0.628 3.755 0.902 0.800 1.232 0.675 0.966 
Estonia 3 1.015 1.177 0.864 0.994 1.265 0.264 4.874 1.008 0.953 1.287 0.860 0.987 
Finland 5 0.828 0.993 0.851 1.004 2.090 0.892 3.230 0.921 0.558 0.850 0.661 1.015 
France 75 0.987 1.122 0.867 1.015 1.677 0.484 4.647 0.989 0.802 1.012 0.795 0.996 
Germany 75 0.864 1.010 0.854 1.020 2.259 3.991 3.561 1.030 0.794 1.269 0.679 0.995 
Greece 7 0.982 1.141 0.848 1.016 2.279 0.580 4.326 0.989 0.773 0.882 0.840 1.093 
Hungary 9 1.076 1.279 0.844 0.998 1.470 0.453 3.908 0.925 0.856 1.211 0.728 0.987 
Ireland 7 0.909 1.002 0.854 1.087 2.567 0.713 4.290 0.989 0.770 1.170 0.770 1.157 
Italy 47 0.966 1.105 0.857 1.046 1.961 0.633 4.381 0.975 0.734 1.023 0.791 0.974 
Latvia 11 1.156 1.458 0.854 0.968 0.962 0.280 4.423 1.027 1.247 1.766 0.753 0.984 
Lithuania 6 0.931 1.105 0.837 1.009 1.253 0.326 4.437 0.955 0.884 1.077 0.889 0.986 
Luxembourg 35 0.887 0.992 0.859 1.046 2.041 0.609 3.875 1.071 1.047 1.792 0.727 1.065 
Malta 4 0.835 0.936 0.843 1.057 1.466 0.593 2.785 0.940 0.644 1.186 0.543 1.013 
Netherlands 14 0.857 0.994 0.849 1.020 1.817 0.550 3.826 0.989 0.651 0.834 0.757 1.036 
Poland 13 0.928 1.124 0.849 0.995 1.602 0.511 3.641 0.951 0.744 1.012 0.725 1.038 
Portugal 11 0.891 1.041 0.844 1.034 2.315 0.668 3.677 0.962 0.934 1.493 0.674 1.023 
Romania 6 1.074 1.220 0.886 0.990 1.667 0.344 4.825 1.052 0.952 1.286 0.791 0.948 
Slovakia 6 0.924 1.031 0.838 1.086 1.694 0.551 3.634 0.909 0.744 1.080 0.672 1.056 
Slovenia 12 0.920 1.031 0.843 1.063 1.332 0.364 4.000 0.937 0.728 0.937 0.771 1.022 
Spain 16 0.953 1.116 0.846 1.011 2.371 0.739 3.770 0.924 1.068 1.483 0.708 0.983 
Sweden 10 0.918 1.037 0.849 1.046 1.960 0.520 4.405 0.969 1.069 1.325 0.799 1.009 
UK 55 0.934 1.065 0.850 1.057 1.834 0.689 3.382 0.979 0.973 1.363 0.666 1.054 
Note: The Table reports the main results for each country in the sample during the U.S. subprime crisis (2007-2008), the 
global financial crisis (2009-2010) and the sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012). MPI is the Malmquist productivity index; eff is 
technical efficiency; tech is technical change; scale is scale efficiency. 
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Table 3: Overall: EU-28. β-convergence and σ-convergence coefficients 
 PERIOD Overall model 1st stage 2nd stage 
  β-convergence σ-convergence β-convergence σ-convergence β-convergence σ-convergence 
1st-2nd 
period 
-1.154*** -1.149*** -1.098*** -1.098*** -1.506*** -1.506*** 
2nd-3rd 
period 
-0.969*** -0.969*** -0.994*** -0.994*** -1.204*** -1.204*** 
Note: The Table reports the main results for all the countries in the sample. The U.S. subprime crisis (2007-2008) and the global 
financial crisis (2009-2010) are the 1st-2nd period of the crisis; the global financial crisis (2009-2010) and the sovereign debt 
crisis (2010-2012) are the 2nd-3rd period. MPI is the Malmquist productivity index; eff is technical efficiency; tech is technical 
change; scale is scale efficiency. *** The coefficient is statistically significant at 0.001. 
 
Figure 2: β-convergence and density functions for the overall model 
a 
 
b  
c 
 
d 
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Appendix A 
Formula (1a) shows the VRS model in period t for the DMU under evaluation where the 
benchmark technology and the observed values are both in period t. Furthermore, the same 
model is also used for period t+1, 𝐷𝑣
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1). The CRS version can be calculated by 
omitting u1 and u2 terms.  
 
 
𝐷𝑣
𝑡(𝑥0
𝑡 , 𝑦0
𝑡) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝑡
𝐷
𝑑=1
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑟𝑦𝑟0
𝑡
𝑠
𝑟=1
+ 𝑢1 + 𝑢2 
  
(1a)  
s.t. 
∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑥𝑖0
𝑡 + ∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝑡
𝐷
𝑑=1
= 1
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
  
 
∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑𝑗
𝑡
𝐷
𝑑=1
− ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑡 + 𝑢1 ≤ 0
𝑚
𝑖=1
, 
 
 
∑ 𝛾𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑗
𝑡
𝑠
𝑟=1
− ∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑𝑗
𝑡
𝐷
𝑑=1
+ 𝑢2 ≤ 0, 
 
 𝛾𝑟 , 𝜇𝑑, 𝜔𝑖 ≥ 0  
 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛;  𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚; 𝑑 = 1, … , 𝐷; 𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠  
 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 are free in sign  
 
 
Similarly, the VRS model for the second stage in period t takes the following form: 
 
 
𝐷𝑣
𝑡,2(𝑥0
𝑡 , 𝑦0
𝑡) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑ 𝛾𝑟y𝑟0
𝑡
𝑠
𝑟=1
+ 𝑢2 
  
(2a)  
s.t. 
∑ 𝜇𝑑z𝑑0
𝑡 = 1
𝐷
𝑑=1
 
  
 
∑ 𝜇𝑑z𝑑0
𝑡
𝐷
𝑑=1
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑟y𝑟0
𝑡
𝑠
𝑟=1
− 𝐸0 ∑ 𝜔𝑖x𝑖0
𝑡
𝑚
𝑖=1
+ 𝑢1 + 𝑢2 = 𝐷𝑣
𝑡(𝑥0
𝑡 , 𝑦0
𝑡), 
 
 
∑ 𝜇𝑑z𝑑j
𝑡
𝐷
𝑑=1
− ∑ 𝜔𝑖x𝑖j
𝑡 + 𝑢1 ≤ 0
𝑚
𝑖=1
, 
 
 
∑ 𝛾𝑟y𝑟j
𝑡
𝑠
𝑟=1
− ∑ 𝜇𝑑z𝑑j
𝑡
𝐷
𝑑=1
+ 𝑢2 ≤ 0 
 
 𝛾𝑟 , 𝜇𝑑, 𝜔𝑖 ≥ 0  
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 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛;  𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚; 𝑑 = 1, … , 𝐷; 𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠  
 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 are free in sign  
Likewise for the first stage: 
 
𝐷𝑣
𝑡,1(𝑥0
𝑡 , 𝑦0
𝑡) =
𝐷𝑣
𝑡(𝑥0
𝑡 , 𝑦0
𝑡) − 𝜉2
∗ ∙ 𝐷𝑣
𝑡,2(𝑥0
𝑡 , 𝑦0
𝑡)
𝜉1
∗  
       (3a)  
The mixed period problem where the benchmark technology and the observed values are in 
different time periods represents the most challenging aspect in calculating Malmquist 
Productivity indices. Here we present the VRS model for the DMU under evaluation. The 
benchmark technology is in period t and the observed values in period t+1. The opposite can be 
easily yielded by setting benchmark in period t+1 and observed values in period t. Again, the 
CRS version can be calculated by omitting u1 and u2 terms. 
 
 
𝐷𝑣
𝑡(𝑥0
𝑡+1, 𝑦0
𝑡+1) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝑡+1
𝐷
𝑑=1
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑟𝑦𝑟0
𝑡+1 + 𝑢1 + 𝑢2
𝑠
𝑟=1
 
  
(4a)  
s.t. 
∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑥𝑖0
𝑡+1 + ∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝑡+1
𝐷
𝑑=1
= 1
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
  
 
∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑𝑗
𝑡
𝐷
𝑑=1
− ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑡 + 𝑢1 ≤ 0
𝑚
𝑖=1
, 
 
 
∑ 𝛾𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑗
𝑡
𝑠
𝑟=1
− ∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑𝑗
𝑡 + 𝑢2
𝐷
𝑑=1
≤ 0, 
 
   𝛾𝑟 , 𝜇𝑑, 𝜔𝑖 ≥ 0  
 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛;  𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚; 𝑑 = 1, … , 𝐷; 𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠  
 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 are free in sign  
Similarly, the VRS model for the second stage takes the following form: 
 
 
𝐷𝑣
𝑡,2(𝑥0
𝑡+1, 𝑦0
𝑡+1) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑ 𝛾𝑟𝑦𝑟0
𝑡+1
𝑠
𝑟=1
+ 𝑢2 
  
(5a)  
s.t. 
∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝑡+1 = 1
𝐷
𝑑=1
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∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝑡+1
𝐷
𝑑=1
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑟𝑦𝑟0
𝑡+1
𝑠
𝑟=1
− 𝐸0 ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑥𝑖0
𝑡+1
𝑚
𝑖=1
+ 𝑢1 + 𝑢2 = 𝐷𝑣
𝑡(𝑥0
𝑡+1, 𝑦0
𝑡+1) 
 
 
∑ 𝜇𝑑z𝑑j
𝑡
𝐷
𝑑=1
− ∑ 𝜔𝑖x𝑖j
𝑡 + 𝑢1 ≤ 0
𝑚
𝑖=1
, 
 
 
∑ 𝛾𝑟y𝑟j
𝑡
𝑠
𝑟=1
− ∑ 𝜇𝑑z𝑑j
𝑡
𝐷
𝑑=1
+ 𝑢2 ≤ 0 
 
 𝛾𝑟 , 𝜇𝑑 , 𝜔𝑖 ≥ 0  
 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛;  𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚; 𝑑 = 1, … , 𝐷; 𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠  
 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 are free in sign  
Likewise for the first stage: 
 
𝐷𝑣
𝑡,1(𝑥0
𝑡+1, 𝑦0
𝑡+1) =
𝐷𝑣
𝑡(𝑥0
𝑡+1, 𝑦0
𝑡+1) − 𝜉2
∗ ∙ 𝐷𝑣
𝑡,2(𝑥0
𝑡+1, 𝑦0
𝑡+1)
𝜉1
∗  
            (6a)  
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Appendix B  
Table 1b: Eurozone: 19. β-convergence and σ-convergence coefficients 
 PERIOD Overall model 1st stage 2nd stage 
  β-convergence σ-convergence β-convergence σ-convergence β-convergence σ-convergence 
1st-2nd 
period 
-1.188*** -1.183*** -1.101*** -1.101*** -1.500*** -1.500*** 
2nd-3rd 
period 
-0.978*** -0.978*** -0.985*** -0.985*** -1.700*** -1.700*** 
Note: The Table reports the main results for the countries in the Eurozone. The U.S. subprime crisis (2007-2008) and the global 
financial crisis (2009-2010) are the 1st-2nd period of the crisis; the global financial crisis (2009-2010) and the sovereign debt 
crisis (2010-2012) are the 2nd-3rd period. MPI is the Malmquist productivity index; eff is technical efficiency; tech is technical 
change; scale is scale efficiency. *** The coefficient is statistically significant at 0.001. 
 
Figure 1b: β-convergence and density functions for Eurozone 
a 
 
b 
 
c 
 
d 
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Table 2a: Non-euro. β-convergence and σ-convergence coefficients 
 PERIOD Overall model 1st stage 2nd stage 
  β-convergence σ-convergence β-convergence σ-convergence β-convergence σ-convergence 
1st-2nd 
period 
-1.094*** 
-1.098*** -1.193*** -1.193*** -1.522*** -1.522*** 
2nd-3rd 
period 
-0.959*** -0.959*** -1.023*** -1.023*** -1.397*** -1.397*** 
Note: The Table reports the main results for the countries outside the Eurozone. The U.S. subprime crisis (2007-2008) and the 
global financial crisis (2009-2010) are the 1st-2nd period of the crisis; the global financial crisis (2009-2010) and the sovereign 
debt crisis (2010-2012) are the 2nd-3rd period. MPI is the Malmquist productivity index; eff is technical efficiency; tech is 
technical change; scale is scale efficiency. *** The coefficient is statistically significant at 0.001. 
 
Figure 2b: β-convergence and density functions for the countries outside the Eurozone 
a 
 
b 
 
c 
 
d 
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Table 3b: GIIPS: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain. β-convergence and σ-convergence 
coefficients 
 
 PERIOD Overall model 1st stage 2nd stage 
  β-convergence σ-convergence β-convergence σ-convergence β-convergence σ-convergence 
1st-2nd 
period 
-1.062*** 
-1.062*** -0.985*** -0.985*** -1.080*** -1.080*** 
2nd-3rd 
period 
-1.045*** -1.045*** -1.009*** -1.009*** -1.042*** -1.042*** 
 
Note: The Table reports the main results for GIIPS countries. The U.S. subprime crisis (2007-2008) and the global financial 
crisis (2009-2010) are the 1st-2nd period of the crisis; the global financial crisis (2009-2010) and the sovereign debt crisis (2010-
2012) are the 2nd-3rd period. MPI is the Malmquist productivity index; eff is technical efficiency; tech is technical change; scale 
is scale efficiency. *** The coefficient is statistically significant at 0.001. 
 
Figure 3b: β-convergence and density functions for GIIPS countries 
a 
 
b 
 
c 
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Table 4b: Euro non-GIIPS. β-convergence and σ-convergence coefficients 
 PERIOD Overall model 1st stage 2nd stage 
  β-convergence σ-convergence β-convergence σ-convergence β-convergence σ-convergence 
1st-2nd 
period 
-1.215*** 
-1.211*** -1.135*** -1.135*** -1.615*** -1.615*** 
2nd-3rd 
period 
-0.945*** -0.945*** -0.967*** -0.967*** -1.198*** -1.198*** 
Note: The Table reports the main results for Euro non-GIIPS countries. The U.S. subprime crisis (2007-2008) and the global 
financial crisis (2009-2010) are the 1st-2nd period of the crisis; the global financial crisis (2009-2010) and the sovereign debt 
crisis (2010-2012) are the 2nd-3rd period. MPI is the Malmquist productivity index; eff is technical efficiency; tech is technical 
change; scale is scale efficiency. *** The coefficient is statistically significant at 0.001. 
 
Figure 4b: β-convergence and density functions for Euro non-GIIPS countries 
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